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NOTES
RETROACTIVITY OF THE REPEAL OF THE DOUBLE
DECLARATION RULE: WOOD V. WOOD
In a partition of community property, the wife sought to have several
parcels of land declared community property since the husband, in the
act of sale by which he acquired the property, had failed to make a
"double declaration" that the property was acquired with his separate
funds for his separate estate. In denying the wife's request, the district
court reasoned that the property was actually acquired by the partition
of a succession, and therefore a "double declaration" was not required
even though the form of the partition was a sale. Affirming the judg-
ment, the first circuit held that since the property was acquired by a
partition of a succession, the acquisition fell within one of the judicially
recognized exceptions to the "double declaration" requirement. The court
further supported its decision by reasoning that the legislation repealing
the "double declaration" requirement could be applied retroactively. Wood
v. Wood, 424 So. 2d 1143 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).'
The double declaration rule evolved jurisprudentially from Civil Code
articles 2334 and 2402, as they existed prior to the enactment of the new
matrimonial regimes law.' Article 2402 established the presumption that
all property acquired during the marriage was community property even
if acquired in the name of only one of the parties. 3 Article 2334 provided
that this presumption could be rebutted by a showing that the property
was either acquired with separate funds, or by inheritance or donation
to only one of the spouses." The jurisprudence interpreting these two
articles established the extra-codal requirement that the husband declare
two things in the document of acquisition in order to avoid a conclusive
presumption of community: (1) that the property was acquired with his
separate funds, and (2) that he intended the property to be his separate
property.' Although the double declaration appeared to be an evidentiary
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Wood also involved questions of application of the parol evidence rule and whether
the family homestead is divisible in kind. These issues-are beyond the scope of this note,
which is limited to the subject of the double declaration requirement.
2. Title VI of book III of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, which contained articles
2325 to 2437, was repealed by Act 627 of 1978. Act 709 of 1979 also repealed title VI
of book Ill, effective January 1, 1980, and enacted a new title VI, consisting of articles
2325 to 2376 under the heading "Matrimonial Regimes."
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2402 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1978 La. Acts, No.
627, § 6).
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334 (as it appeared prior to its repeal by 1978 La. Acts, No.
627, § 6).
5. See, e.g., Phillips v. Nereaux, 357 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Primeaux
v. Libersat, 307 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 322 So. 2d 147
(La. 1975); Thomas v. Thomas, 27 So. 2d 758 (La. App. Orl. 1946).
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presumption, the jurisprudence applied it as a rule of classification of
property. 6
Two functions of the double declaration were generally recognized.
The first function was to provide notice and certainty of title to third
parties via public recordation since, unlike property in the wife's name,
any title to property in the husband's name without a double declaration
was presumed to be community property.' The second function of the
double declaration rule was to provide counter-balancing protection for
the wife under the old "head and master" regime.' Without the require-
ment, the husband's control over the community allowed him to keep
good investments by subsequent declarations that the property was his
separately or to burden the community by remaining silent about
depreciating or debt-ridden property.'
Nevertheless, three exceptions to the double declaration requirement
existed with regard to immovables: (1) sales made to effect a partition,"0
(2) exchanges of land owned separately by the husband in which the act
of exchange showed true consideration, although no recital of separate
ownership was made in the act," and (3) sale/re-sale transactions which
have been treated by the courts as security devices.' 2 In cases in which
the transaction appeared to be a sale lacking a double declaration, the
courts looked beyond the form of the act to ascertain its actual nature
and determine whether one of the exceptions was applicable.' 3
The Wood court emphasized the necessity of looking behind the form
of the act in question to the substance of the acquisition in order to deter-
mine the status of the acquired property as separate or community. In
holding that the property was acquired by a partition, the court examined
the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the transactions in
question fell within one of the three exceptions to the double declaration
requirement for immovables. The court noted several characteristics which
evidenced that the transactions were actually a partition of a succession
between the defendant, his mother, his uncle, and his coheirs: (1) no cash
6. Samuel, The Retroactivity Provisions of Louisiana's Equal Management Law:
Interpretation and Constitutionality, 39 LA. L. REV. 347, 399 (1979).
7. Primeaux v. Libersat, 307 So. 2d 740, 745 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
322 So. 2d 147 (La. 1975).
8. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2325-2437 (as they appeared prior to their repeal by 1978 La.
Acts, No. 627, § 6).
9. See case cited supra note 7.
10. Troxler v. Colley, 33 La. Ann. 425 (1881).
11. Lawson v. Ripley, 17 La. 238 (1841).
12. E.g., Ruffino v. Hunt, 234 La. 91, 99 So. 2d 34 (1958); Champagne v. Eusea,
388 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Cookmeyer v. Cookmeyer, 274 So. 2d 739 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1973); Lazaro v. Lazaro, 92 So. 2d 402 (La. App. Orl. 1957).
13. Huie, Separate Ownership of Specific Property Versus Restitution from Community
Property in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REV. 427, 444-62 (1952).
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was actually exchanged, (2) the prices were too small to be considered
serious, (3) the property was obtained entirely through inheritance and
donations, and (4) the acts stated that the interests in the property devolved
from the succession of the defendant's father. All these facts persuaded
the court that a partition to settle a succession occurred rather than a
true sale; therefore, the property was the defendant-husband's separate
property."' The court's conclusion, in this respect, is consistent with the
jurisprudence in that prior courts looked to the actual nature of the trans-
action in question rather than to what the transaction purported to be. 5
In fact, the existence of three exceptions to the double declaration re-
quirement makes it incumbent upon any court to examine the surround-
ing circumstances first to determine whether a double declaration was
necessary. Hence, since the validity of the double declaration requirement
need not be evaluated before the nature of the acquisition is examined,
the court's holding may be limited to a finding that a partition occurred,
thereby obviating the need for a double declaration. In any event, the
Wood court adhered to the rationale of the exceptions to the double
declaration requirement-that of looking behind the form of the act and
examining its true nature.' 6
In support of its refusal to apply the double declaration requirement
in Wood, the first circuit stated that the historical reasons for the double
declaration had no rational bases and that, in any event, Civil Code article
2340, which eliminated the double declaration requirement, should be
applied retroactively."' An analysis of the court's decision reveals that while
the holding is correct, the court's reasoning is questionable. Despite the
problems with the rationale of the opinion, the court's examination of
the retroactivity of Civil Code article 2340 is important.
Consistent with its reasoning in Phillips v. Nereaux,"I the Wood court
rejected the rationale that the double declaration is necessary to make
third-party purchasers relying on the public records aware that the prop-
erty being acquired may not be community property. Since a double
14. 424 So. 2d at 1149. Once the Wood court found that the transaction was actually
a partition, it appropriately recognized this as one of the traditional exceptions to the double
declaration requirement. See, e.g., Troxler v. Colley, 33 La. Ann 425 (1881); Primeaux
v. Libersat, 307 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 322 So. 2d 147
(La. 1975); Succession of Miangolarra, 297 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
15. See, e.g., Troxier v. Colley, 33 La. Ann. 425 (1881); Succession of Miangolarra,
297 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); McElwee v. McElwee, 255 So. 2d 883 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1971).
16. See Huie, supra note 12, at 444-62.
17. Wood v. Wood, 424 So. 2d 1143, 1147, 1151 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982). Civil Code
article 2340 provides: "Things in the possession of a spouse during the existence of a regime
of community of acquets and gains are presumed to be community, but either spouse may
prove that they are separate property."
18. 357 So. 2d 813, 815-19 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
1984]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
declaration does not provide a conclusive presumption that the husband
owns the property separately, the third party must still determine whether
the property is community, thus requiring the wife's signature.' 9 Hence,
a double declaration is not conclusive as to third parties relying on the
public records.
The court pointed out that the second reason for the double declara-
tion requirement, that of protecting the wife from the husband's ability
to subsequently withhold good investments or "dump" bad investments
at the community's expense, is also based on the erroneous assumption
that a double declaration necessarily renders the property separate-an
incorrect assumption since the husband must prove by a preponderance
of evidence that the property is separate even if he has made a double
declaration.2" According to the court, if the husband is able to meet this
burden of proof, he should prevail since former Civil Code article 2334
provided that property acquired with separate funds is owned separately.
The court concluded that the only loss to the wife is the expectation that
the property was community. The court also noted that with or without
a double declaration, the husband could fearlessly squander, waste, or
speculate with questionable investments by withholding evidence that the
investment is his separate property, resulting in community liability for
the investment and any debts it might accrue. 2'
The court's conclusion that without the double declaration require-
ment the only possible loss suffered by the wife would be the expectation
that the property was community is misleading in that this loss can be
costly for the wife in at least two situations. First, the wife's expectations
of the value of the community may significantly influence her decision
to sue for divorce and separation of the community. She may decide that
such action would not be economically feasible if certain property is not
part of the community. A similar reason for protecting the wife against
the loss of this expectation of community property would occur in the
event of the husband's dying intestate. The surviving wife is granted a
legal usufruct only over the husband's share of the community property,
not his separate property, when he dies intestate.22 The loss of this "mere"
expectation could be quite costly. Should the wife not expect the prop-
erty to be part of the community, her plans for self-provision upon her
husband's death would in many instances be significantly different. These
two examples illustrate that the loss of an expectation of community prop-
erty could likely produce an unexpected hardship. Thus, the court in Wood
failed to recognize the true loss that may accompany the loss of a wife's
19. Id. at 819.
20. 424 So. 2d at 1147.
21. Primeaux v. Libersat, 307 So. 2d 740, 745 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
322 So. 2d 147 (La. 1975).
22. LA. CIv. CODE art. 890.
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expectation that certain property is community. The court, however,
attempted to bolster its position by stating that former Civil Code article
2334 should permit the husband to prevail in proving his separate owner-
ship without a double declaration if he can prove its separate nature by
a preponderance of evidence.23 But since the jurisprudence disagrees with
this interpretation and requires a double declaration, the Wood court's
reading of former article 2334 is simply a restatement of its own position
against the double declaration requirement.
Having stated its holding, the Wood court embarked on a discussion
of the retroactive application of Civil Code article 2340, the legislative
repeal of the jurisprudentially-created double declaration rule. It is unclear
whether this discussion is an alternative rationale in support of the court's
holding or merely dictum. Regardless of its nature, if this reasoning were
accepted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the double declaration require-
ment would be eliminated regardless of when the marriage began or the
property was acquired.
Generally, a law can prescribe only for the future. 2' The Wood court
noted, however, that the Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held
that this restriction does not apply to laws which are merely procedural
rather than substantive.2" Thus, the bar to retroactive application of the
elimination of the double declaration rule would require a finding that
article 2340 is substantive and that retroactive application would divest
the wife of a vested right.26 The court rejected the argument that retro-
active application of article 2340 would divest a wife of a vested right,
since vested rights can only arise from contracts, statutes, or operation
of law.27 The first circuit stated that court decisions are not law in
Louisiana,2 8 and that no substantive rights are created by jurisprudence.2 9
Therefore, since the double declaration rule was only jurisprudentially
created, retroactive application of article 2340, which eliminates the re-
quirement, would not divest any vested right.3"
The court in Wood addressed the argument that since conclusive
presumptions have traditionally been considered substantive law,3 and since
the absence of a double declaration created a conclusive presumption of
23. 424 So. 2d at 1147.
24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 8.
25. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1339 (La. 1978).
26. 424 So. 2d at 1151.
27. Pfister v. St. Bernard Cypress Co., 155 La. 575, 589, 99 So. 454, 459 (1923).
28. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1334 (La. 1978)
cited in Wood, 424 So. 2d at 1149; e.g., Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La.
135, 146, 150 So. 855, 858 (1933).
29. Pfister v. St. Bernard Cypress Co., 55 La. 575, 589, 99 So. 454, 459 (1923) cited
in Wood, 424 So. 2d at 1151.
30. 424 So. 2d at 1151.
31. Dwyer, Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 21 Loy. L. REV. 377, 393 (1975).
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community property, the double declaration rule was a substantive law
thereby making any law which repeals it also substantive.32 In rejecting
this argument, the court pointed out that, in Louisiana, law is the solemn
expression of legislative will3 and that courts merely interpret the law.3
Since mere "interpretations" by the courts do not create or eliminate
substantive rights, the jurisprudentially-created double declaration require-
ment is not substantive. 5 Since article 2340 does not abrogate a substan-
tive rule of law, it cannot be said to be a substantive law due to the
nature of the law it abrogates. And since article 2340 establishes a rebut-
table presumption of community rather than an irrebuttable presumption,
it is procedural and can be. applied retroactively.
The Wood court attached great weight to the fact that while the
matrimonial regimes laws enacted in Act 627 of 1978 prohibited retro-
active changes in classification of property as separate or community
3 6
(which is precisely what retroactive elimination of the double declaration
rule would do), Act 709 of 1979, which completely repealed Act 627 and
of which article 2340 is a part, did not contain such a prohibition.37 In
light of this omission, the court reasoned that "the legislation [of 1979]
does not prevent a retroactive application of the elimination of the double
declaration requirement." 38 Evidently, the court felt that this omission
indicated a change in the intent of the legislature and implied an inten-
tion that the new law be given retroactive application. While the omis-
sion was arguably deliberate,39 there are sound reasons for concluding
that the failure to include a retroactivity provision did not represent a
change in legislative intent. In Freeman v. Freeman," the second circuit
refused to give Act 709 retroactive effect, stating that without an express
provision for or indicating retroactive effect, no retroactive effect could
be given. Professors Katherine S. Spaht and Cynthia Samuel also con-
tend that the omission of retroactivity provisions in Act 709 did not repre-
sent a change in legislative intent from Act 627 of 1978.' Professor Samuel
argues forcefully that the double declaration requirement was a rule of
32. 424 So. 2d at 1150.
33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1.
34. See cases cited supra note 27.
35. E.g., Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135, 146, 150 So. 855, 858
(1933); Pfister v. St. Bernard Cypress Co., 155 La. 575, 589, 99 So. 454, 459 (1923).
36. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 9.
37. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709.
38. 424 So. 2d at 1150.
39. Wattigny v. Wattigny, 402 So. 2d 776, 778 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
40. 430 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983), writ denied.
41. Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of
the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 LA. L. REV. 83, 109 (1979).
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classification of marital property creating substantive rights and, therefore,
according to Act 627, elimination of the requirement could not be given
retroactive effect."2 Hence, Act 709 apparently did not represent a change
in legislative intent from Act 627, and the repeal of Civil Code articles
2334 and 2402 (and the legislative overruling of the jurisprudence inter-
preting them as requiring a double declaration) cannot be given retro-
active effect. Therefore, since according to this reasoning article 2340 is
substantive and no express 43 or implied4 4 provision for its retroactive
application was made in Act 709, no retroactive application is possible.45
However, two arguments support retroactive application of article
2340. First, the Louisiana Supreme Court could hold that while the double
declaration doctrine has operated as a rule of classification, this was not
its original purpose. 46 The court could then overrule those cases which
misapplied the court-created doctrine by finding that the double declara-
tion doctrine is merely an evidentiary rule and, as such, is procedural.
Therefore, the new legislation repealing the doctrine could be given retro-
active effect. The second argument for applying the provisions of Act
799 in the Wood case is based on the language of article 2340. Article
2340 requires the courts to permit the husband to present evidence of
his separate ownership of property in all court proceedings after the
statute's effective date. Hence, the courts would apply this new provision
in all cases arising after January 1, 1980,4 and husbands would be per-
mitted to prove the separate nature of the property in question even though
no double declaration was made at the time of acquisition. The only
obstacle to such an application would be the possibility of divesting the
wife of a vested right.48 As indicated earlier, 9 the wife arguably would
not lose a vested right by losing the conclusive presumption of communi-
ty created by the absence of the double declaration. Thus, implementing
article 2340 according to its effective date would eliminate the need to
enforce the double declaration rule in most, if not all, cases. However,
given the harsh consequences that may result from retroactive application
of article 2340, ° the supreme court should not adopt either of these
arguments.
42. Samuel, supra note 6, at 398-400.
43. 1979 La. Acts, No. 627, § 9; Freeman v. Freeman, 430 So. 2d 673 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1983), writ denied.
44. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 40, at 109; Samuel, supra note 6, at 398-400.
45. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1338 (La. 1978).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
47. See 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, § 13.
48. Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 42
LA. L. REv. 596, 601-04 (1982).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
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Conclusion
If the Louisiana Supreme Court were to accept the Wood court's posi-
tion on retroactivity, the double declaration requirement would be
eliminated regardless of when the marriage began or the property was
acquired. The effect of this would be to strip the wife of an expectation
of community property-a loss with potentially severe repercussions to
the wife. The loss of this expectation of community may significantly in-
fluence the wife's decision to sue for divorce since the division of the
community would, in certain instances, result in a significantly lesser
amount of property going to the wife. This reduction might make a divorce
and separation of the community economically infeasible for the wife.
Those women contemplating, commencing, or involved in such litigation
would be adversely affected by a retroactive application of article 2340.
Similar effects would be felt by those women whose husbands were to
die intestate. With retroactive application of Civil Code article 2340, their
expectations of economic self-sufficiency would be drastically altered by
the fact that the wife does not acquire a usufruct over the husband's
separate property-a potentially disastrous result for those who believed
their economic resources would be sufficient upon their husbands' death.
No provision in Act 709 expressly provides for retroactivity and no
strong reasons exist for implying legislative intent for retroactive applica-
tion. Thus, for legal, logical, and practical reasons, the Wood court's
rationale for retroactive application of Civil Code article 2340 should not
be accepted by other Louisiana courts.
James Edwin Bailey, III
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